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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
WELBY AAGARD, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
DAYTON & MILLER 
RED-E-MIX CONCRETE 
COMPANY and 
THOMAS CHARLES COO~ 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 9373 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
In this Brief we will refer to Plaintiff and 
Appellant as Plaintiff, and Defendants and Respon-
dents as Defendants. The Record will be referred 
to by R., and the Transcript of Testimony will be 
referred to by the letters Tr. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts in the Appellant's 
Brief deals principally with portions of the testi-
mony of the two drivers involved. In this Statement 
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we will endeavor to point out additional facts con-
cerning the physical conditions of the highway where 
the accident occurred, the physical evidence as to 
the nature and point of contact between the two 
vehicles, and addi tiona! testimony given by the driv-
ers and witnesses so there will be a more complete 
picture of the evidence that was before the Trial 
Court. 
U. S. Highway 30 South run~ generally east 
and west between Morgan and Devil's Slide, Utah. 
The accident occurred approximately two miles west 
of Devil's Slide at a point where the Highway forms 
an ''S" type curve and passes, at an angle, under 
a railroad overpass. The traveled portion of the 
highway is somewhat restricted by the cement abut-
ments of the overpass and is 22 feet in width with-
out shoulders. (See Ex. 1 through 11 -Scale Dia-
gram and correlated photographs) . 
The bed and rack of plain tiff's sheep truck was 
7¥2 feet wide, 16 feet long, and was 9 feet 4 inches 
high from the ground. The rack was equipped with 
,an upper and lower deck, and at the time of the 
accident was loaded with 56 lambs on the top deck 
and 44 lambs on the lower deck, each weighing 
'approximately 75 pounds (R. 9, 10). 
The points of contact on defendant's ready-
mix cement truck were on the left end of a water 
supply tank located above and behind the truck's 
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cab and on the left rear corner of a fender plat-
form over the rear dual tires. There was only slight 
damage to the defendants' truck (Tr. 3~9, 60, 61, 
110- Ex. 12, 13, 14). 
The points of contact on plaintiff's truck were 
the angle iron uprights along the left side of the 
rack. Trooper Mason W. Hill of the Utah Highway 
Patrol, who investigated, described the damage oh 
plaintiff's truck as starting very light toward the 
front and getting a little more severe as it went to 
the rear of the rack, and referred to the damage as 
indicating a very light impact (Tr. 59). 
Clifford Bloomquist, driver of plaintiff's truck, 
testified that he passed through the underpass head-
ed west and was about 21f2 truck lengths west of it 
when he first saw defendants' truck coming around 
the curve toward him, that it was on his side of 
the road about 200 feet away, that he knew there 
was going to be an accident, but he did not apply 
his brakes ( Tr. 22, 23, 24). Bloomquist fixed the 
position of defendants' truck on the highway by 
reference to two painted yellow dividing lines (Tr. 
22). Officer Hill testified that the road through 
the underpass was newly surfaced (Tr. 53, 54), 
and the absence of a center line is noted on his 
investigation work sheet (Ex. B.). 
Trooper Hill first interviewed Bloomquist ap-
proximately an hour after the accident. At that 
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time plaintiff's truck was parked 2/lOths of a mile 
west of the underpass and was about 50 or 75 feet 
off the highway. The sheep that he had been carry-
ing were on a side hill ('Tr. 36). 
Trooper Hill testified as to his conversation 
with Bloomquist as follows (Tr. 36, 37): 
"Q. What did you do then, Mr. Hill? 
A. I asked this gentleman if he was the 
driver, and he told me he was. I asked him 
what happened, and he informed me that the 
cement truck had sideswiped him in the un-
derpass. I asked him where the driver was 
and he said that the cement truck had not 
stopped. 
Q. Now, did you go up to the underpass 
at that time? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were you able to see any signs on 
the road or around there, Mr. Hill, that in-
dicated the point of impact or the place where 
this had occurred? 
A. No, I didn't. I ·could not find any 
place showing the point of impact." 
And again on cross examination regarding his 
conversation with Bloomquist, Trooper Hill testi-
fied (Tr. 54): 
"A. I asked Mr. Bloomquist what had 
happened and he told me that a cement truck 
had sideswiped him in the underpass. 
Q. In the underpass? 
A. Yes.'' 
Thomas Cook had been driving a cement truck 
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for the defendant, Dayton & Miller, for nine months 
prior to the accident ('Tr. 102). He was familiar 
with the highway and the area in question and had 
made five trips by there the previous week (Tr. 
103). As he approached the underpass traveling 
east, he was hugging the right shoulder of the road 
traveling 25 mph. (Tr. 106, 107). As he reached 
the west end of the underpass he observed plain-
tiff's truck rounding the curve approaching the 
underpass from the east at a pretty fast rate of 
speed. It appeared to be on its own side of the road 
as it rounded the curve, but as it passed defendants' 
truck it looked very close, and then Cook heard a 
noise like someone running a stick along a picket 
fence (Tr. 107, 108). He saw the rear of plaintiff's 
truck going under the underpass in his rear view 
mirror. He pulled off and parked his truck on the 
shoulder of the road at the first point that was wide 
enough, approximately 600 or 700 feet east of tne 
underpass. Witnesses Jerome C. Rush and Ethel 
Rush were at their car preparing a picnic lunch 
at approximately where Cook stopped. Cook walked 
west back through the underpass. He could see dust 
arising from the ground, but plaintiff's truck was 
not in sight (Tr. 108, 120, 132, 13'3). 
Both witnesses, Mr. and Mrs. Rush, had ob-
served plaintiff's truck. As it passed them it was 
coming fast (Tr. 123, 132). They then heard a 
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crash (Tr. 123, 130). They could not see the under-
pass from where they were ('Tr. 128). 
This case was tried to the court sitting without 
a jury. At the conclusion of the trial, the case was 
taken under advisement and the court subsequently 
entered its judgment in favor of the defendants. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS OF 
THE TRIAL COURT. 
POINT II. 
THE TESTIMONY OF THOMAS CHARLES COOK 
IS CONSISTENT WITH THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE 
AND FACTS AS CONTENDED BY DEFENDANTS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS OF 
THE TRIAL COURT. 
'The trial court, in rendering its judgment, 
made the following finding: 
"That the evidence was evenly balanced 
as to 'vhich of the parties was negligent" 
The defendants, having prevailed at the trial 
court, are now entitled to have the evidence viewed 
in the light most favorable to them: W eenig Bros. v. 
Manning, 1 Ut. 2d 101, 26'2 P. 2d 491. 
This court also in the W eenig Case, supra, in 
considering the burden of an appellant in seeking a 
review of a trial court's finding of fact, stated as 
follows: 
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"In order to upset the judgment and com-
mand one in its favor the first obstacle plain-
tiff must overcome is to demonstrate that 
the evidence shows with such certainty that 
reasonable minds could not differ thereon, 
that the defendant was guilty of negligence 
which proximately caused the collision. In 
the absence of such degree of proof we could 
not direct that such finding be made andre-
verse the. decision of the lower court." 
Plaintiff claims defendants' truck was on the 
wrong side of the road. The evidence of physical 
damage to the vehicles indicated a minor sideswip-
ing type of collision between the left side of plain--
tiff's truck rack and the left rear corner of de-
fendants' truck. This contact could as logically have 
resulted from plaintiff's truck swinging over into 
defendants' path as plaintiff's driver started to 
enter the underpass or from the close proximity of 
both trucks to the center of the road because of the 
restrictive conditions of the underpass. 
The fact that the end of the water supply tank 
on defendants' truck was scraped by plaintiff's 
rack without any contact being made with defen-
dants' rear view mirror, which extended beyond 
the width of the mixer and tank, when viewed with 
the further fact that the amount of impact and 
damage on plaintiff's sheep rack on the left side in-
creased in severity toward the rear, is strong evi-
dence that plaintiff's truck was leaning and crossing 
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over into the path of defendants' truck as it passed. 
So also the physical effect of such a contact would 
be to swing the front of plain tiff's truck to its left 
rather than pushing it to its right and off the road 
as testified to by plaintiff's driver ( Tr. 7). 
It is now a well established rule in this juris-
diction, and the weight of authority generally, that 
a plaintiff, in order to prevail, must establish the 
negligence of the defendant and its proximate cause 
to plaintiff's damage by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, and where the evidence is evenly balanced as 
to· which of two or more probable causes resulted 
in the damage complained of, plaintiff has failed 
to sustain his burden. ·The rule was stated thus in 
the early case of Tremelling v. Southern Pacific Co., 
51 Utah 189, 170 Pac. 80 (p. 83): 
· "If the probabilities are equally balanced 
that the accident was produced by a cause for 
which the defendant is responsible or by one 
for which he is not, the plaintiff must fail." 
This rule has been followed consistently in Utah, 
Perrin v. U.P.R.R. Co., 59 Utah 1, 201 Pac. 405, 
Sumsion v. Streator-Smith, 103 Utah 44, 132 P. 2d 
680, Devine v. Cook, 3 Utah 134, 279 P. 2d 1073, 
In Re Richards, 5 Utah 2d 106, 2'9'7 P. 2d 542. 
The plaintiff on argument in his brief refers 
to the testimony of driver Bloomquist as clear, un-
equivocal and consistent. Mr. Bloomquist testified 
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on cross-examination that when he first saw de-
fendants' truck it was 200 feet away, that it was 
completely on his side of the road and he knew there 
was going to be an accident, but he didn't touch 
his brakes or reduce his speed. (Tr. 23, 24, 28, 29). 
It is submitted that such is not consistent with the 
reactions of a normally prudent driver. Again when 
Trooper Hill first interviewed Bloomquist within 
an hour after the accident, Bloomquist stated that 
a cern en t truck had sideswiped him in the under-
pass (Tr. 36, 54), not somel 200 feet west of the 
underpass where, as a matter of fact, the underpass 
would have had no ·connection with the accident. 
POINT II. 
THE TESTIMONY OF THOMAS CHARLES COOK 
IS CONSISTENT WITH THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE 
AND FACTS AS CONTENDED BY DEFENDANTS. 
The plaintiff cites the case of Fowler v. Pleas-
ant Valley Coal Company, 16 Utah 348, 52 Pac. 594, 
for the rule of law that a party is bound by the testi-
mony he gives. He contends that the testimony of 
Cook to the effect that he did not observe the plain-
tiff's truck on the wrong side of the road precludes 
the finding that he was ever on the wrong side of 
the road. 
Defendant is in full accord with the rule as 
stated in the Fowler case. However, defendant's 
testimony that he didn't see the plaintiff's truck 
encroaching upon his side of the road is not incon-
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sistent, as contended by the plaintiff, with the phy-
sical facts· indicating that he was. Further, the rule 
of law contains an e~ception within the rule itself. 
Thus, a party's material statement of fact may 
negative his defense unless: 
"More favorable testimony appears to 
contradict or modify ... " (169 ALR 798, 
799, cited in Appellant's Brief, Page 17.) 
There are two reasons why this rule is of no 
aid or comfort to the plaintiff. First, the fact that 
Cook may not have seen the plaintiff driving upon 
the wrong side of the road does not preclude the fact 
that he did violate the defendant's right of way 
as supported by the established facts. 
Cook, in his testimony regarding the position 
of the plaintiff's truck, stated (Tr. 108): 
"Q. Did he appear to be on his side of 
the road? 
A. He was when he was coming around 
the corner, he was on his side. 
Q. All right, go ahead. 
A. As he passed me it looked like he 
was very close and it sounded like somebo_d~ 
running down the picket fence with a sticK. 
Q. Did you feel anything? 
A. No." 
It is to be observed that there was no center 
dividing line on the road, and any statements re-
garding the truck's position upon the highway were 
10 
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of necessity based upon estimates. The physical facts 
indicate that the trucks did not come into contact 
with each other until the cab portions of each had 
passed. The water tank of the defendants' truck 
then came into contact with the side of the sheep 
rack, and the degree of contact increased during 
the entire length of plaintiff's rack as the trucks 
passed, indicating that there was a gradual and in-
creasing encroachment by the plaintiff's truck into 
defendants' truck, which was proceeding on its side 
of the road. 
Defendant did not state that plaintiff never 
crossed into his lane of traffic. Such a statement, 
had it been made, may have fallen within the rule 
upon which the plaintiff relies so desperately and 
may have precluded his defense in the absence of 
other evidence which would tend to contradict or 
modify it. 
Second, even if the rule as contended by the 
plaintiff were to apply in the instant case, the facts 
bring it within the exception stated within the rule 
because there was favorable and competent testi-
mony in the nature of physical evidence, as discussed 
above, which was introduced at trial, tending to 
contradict and modify any statement or inference 
by defendant that plaintiff's truck did not cross 
the center point of the highway. Had the defendant 
testified that he observed the plaintiff's truck en-
11 
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croaching upon his side of the highway at the in-
stant of impact, such testimony would have been 
strange indeed, and it is doubtful whether such a 
statement would have been worthy of belief. Under 
the circumstances the defendant's attention was di-
rected to the road ahead of him, and he would have 
had to have looked behind him at the instant of im-
pact to have observed the precise position of plain-
tiff's truck upon the highway. 
To hold that defendant must testify to the 
observance of the act constituting negligence on 
the part of plaintiff in order to state an effective 
defense, would be to permit recovery by a negligent 
motorist merely because the defendant and victim 
of his negligence failed to observe plaintiff's pre-
cise violation. To so hold would be to ignore the whole 
field of physical and circumstantial evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully concluded that the evidence 
not only supports the findings of the trial court 
but in fact preponderates in favor of the defendants. 
The judgment of the Second District Court from 
which this cause arises must be affirmed. 
Resp~ctfully submitted, 
HANSON, BALDWIN & ALLEN 
and ROBERT W. BRANDT 
515 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Respondents. 
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